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What is the relationship between attention and conscious awareness? Aware-
ness sometimes appears to be restricted to the contents of focused attention,
yet at other times irrelevant distractors will dominate awareness. This
contradictory relationship has also been reflected in an abundance of discre-
pant research findings leading to an enduring controversy in cognitive
psychology. Lavie’s load theory of attention suggests that the puzzle can
be solved by considering the role of perceptual load. Although distractors
will intrude upon awareness in conditions of low load, awareness will be
restricted to the content of focused attention when the attended information
involves high perceptual load. Here, we review recent evidence for this pro-
posal with an emphasis on the various subjective blindness phenomena, and
their neural correlates, induced by conditions of high perceptual load. We
also present novel findings that clarify the role of attention in the response to
stimulus contrast. Overall, this article demonstrates a critical role for perceptual
load across the spectrum of perceptual processes leading to awareness, from the
very early sensory responses related to contrast detection to explicit recognition
of semantic content.1. Introduction
(a) Definitions and historical context
The terms attention and awareness have acquired various meanings over years
of intensive study of both. It is thus useful to clarify our use of these terms. Our
use of the term attention refers to the allocation of limited-capacity mental
resources to processing. Our use of the term awareness refers to visual or per-
ceptual awareness: the phenomenal experience related to perception that is
accessible for report.
Our focus, however, is not on one definition or another but rather on the
relationship between attention and awareness. At times, attention and aware-
ness appear intimately linked in our personal experience, as when we find
ourselves solely aware of what we are attending to (e.g. a football match)
while being oblivious to what we do not attend to (e.g. our friend talking to
us). At other times, attention and awareness appear to diverge, and we find
ourselves unable to block awareness of irrelevant distractions despite focusing
attention on our task (e.g. being distracted by the indication of a new email
while reading this article).
Psychology research has mirrored this puzzling pattern. Indeed, the very
question of whether awareness depends on paying attention at all has stimulated
a heated controversy that lasted several decades. Demonstrations that people
failed to note various types of unattended events, including those that would
appear to be rather conspicuous (e.g. a woman crossing a game pitch, holding
an open umbrella, while people attend to the ball game on the pitch [1]), have
led to the early selection view, in which selective attention filters information
early on in the processing stream, on the basis of rudimentary physical character-
istics of the stimuli, before full perception and awareness of the stimulus meaning
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cation of focused attention. The early selection view could not
account, however, for other findings that demonstrated intru-
sions of unattended information into awareness [2,3]. Such
findings led to the opposing late selection view in which atten-
tional selection occurs later in the processing stream, after full
perceptual awareness, filtering out irrelevant information
from processes such as memory and overt responses [4].
Under this view, failures to note unattended events, which pro-
vided support for the early selection view, merely reflected
failures of memory rather than perception. Such an account
was particularly pertinent as, in most paradigms, participants’
reports were collected retrospectively, after the unattended
event. Lending support to the early selection view, however,
Treisman & Geffen [5] had participants respond immediately
to both attended and unattended events (by tapping on the
table when targets are presented) but nonetheless found that
while participants detected 87% of the attended target words,
they only detected 8% of unattended targets. While experi-
ments such as these would provide support for one or the
other theory, no consistent pattern emerged. Thus, while the
early versus late selection debate stimulated much research, it
remained unresolved formanydecades (for reviews, see [6–8]).(b) Load theory
Load theory of attention [9,10] has offered a resolution to this
debate by viewing the question in a different light, applying
a capacity approach which has been rather overlooked in pre-
vious theories of selective attention (for discussion, see [8]) to
understand the relationship between selective attention and
perception. According to load theory, perceptual processing
has limited capacity but proceeds automatically in an involun-
tary, mandatory manner on all information within its capacity.
It follows, therefore, that in attended tasks involving a large
amount of information, in other words high perceptual
load, capacity is fully exhausted by the processing of the
attended information, resulting in no perception of unattended
information. By contrast, in tasks of low perceptual load,
because perception cannot be voluntarily stopped, spare
capacity from processing the information in the attended
task will inevitably spill over, resulting in the perception of
task-irrelevant information that people intended to ignore.
Effective selective and focused attention therefore requires
not just active maintenance of a top-down attentional priority
for a task-relevant set (e.g. as indicated in the task instruc-
tions) but also a high level of perceptual load that will tax
all the available capacity (e.g. [11]). While clear top-down set-
tings are necessary to distinguish relevant from irrelevant
information so that higher priority is given to the relevant
information, prevention of capacity allocation (spillover) to
the irrelevant information can only occur as a natural conse-
quence of reduced availability of perceptual processing
capacity under load.1
Load theory not only provides a resolution to the early
versus late selection debate, but also clarifies the nature of
attention in a theory that allows attention mechanisms to be
more fully integrated with theories of awareness. The claim
that all perceptual processing has limited capacity refers to
both conscious and unconscious processing. Thus, the effects
of load are not confined to a specific level of processing: for
example, not just to accessibility for report. However, load
theory does have clear implications for awareness. For astimulus to reach awareness, it needs to receive sufficient pro-
cessing capacity for its content (e.g. a vertical line over a dot)
and meaning (an exclamation mark) to be perceived. Aware-
ness will thus be clearly confined to just the attended task
information under conditions of high perceptual load (allowing
for early selection effects of top-down attentional selection). In
conditions of low load, however, awarenesswill not be confined
to just those stimuli specified by top-down selection settings as
‘to be attended to’. Owing to the involuntary nature of percep-
tion, irrelevant information that people intend to ignore can
reach full awareness under conditions of low perceptual load
(resulting in late attentional selection). Load theory thus
makes clear predictions for the effects of attention on awareness:
awareness will depend on the level of perceptual load of the
attended processing.
Note that with respect to the perennial issue of the relation-
ship between attention and awareness, the distinction that load
theory makes between top-down attention selection settings,
which are under voluntary control, and the involuntary allo-
cation of limited-capacity perceptual resources proves useful.
On views that equate attention just with the top-down atten-
tion settings, the findings that irrelevant stimuli (for which
the top-down attention settings are ‘to ignore’) can nonetheless
reach awareness in conditions of low load may be taken as
evidence for awareness without attention. However, with the
mechanistic definition of attention in load theory in which
selection will depend on whether capacity limits are reached
or not, it is clear that in conditions of low load all stimuli
are in fact attended, including those specified as irrelevant.
Thus in load theory, there cannot be awareness without the
allocation of limited-capacity attention; however, attention
cannot be equated with intention or the top-down attentional
selection settings.
Of course, following the basic rules of propositional logic,
‘no awareness without attention’ does not imply ‘no attention
without awareness’ nor that attention will always lead to
awareness. The allocation of attentional resources to stimuli
may not always be sufficient to bring them to awareness,
and depriving a stimulus of attention may alter its sensory
processing at even an unconscious level (we describe direct
evidence for this later on in §6). Thus, attention and aware-
ness remain separate in load theory, despite being closely
interlinked in many cases.
In this article, we review the contributions of load theory
to understand the relationship between attention, awareness
and the related neural activity, while including novel data
that demonstrate a novel interaction between perceptual
load and the fundamental mechanisms of contrast sensitivity.2. Perceptual load and distractor interference
measures
Early work established the effects of perceptual load on
perception somewhat indirectly, using measures of distractor
interference on the task reaction time (RT). The level of percep-
tual load in the task can be increased either by presenting a
larger number of heterogeneous items to be processed or by
increasing the number and complexity of perceptual operations
that the task involves (while keeping the number of stimuli
constant across the levels of load, see figure 1a,b). Both types
of perceptual loadmanipulationswere found to reduce distract-
or interference effects. For instance, in response-competition
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Figure 1. Schematic of the experiment procedures (a,b) and results (c) from [13]. This figure illustrates a load manipulation in which the task varies but the stimuli
are identical (a) or the set size of heterogeneous items is increased in a random subset of the trials (b) across low and high loads. A critical stimulus is added on the
last trial. Both load (black bars, low load; white bars, high load) manipulations led to a substantial reduction in awareness reports for this stimulus (c). (Online
version in colour.)
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appearance of distractors that are associated with another
target response (compared to response-congruent or response-
neutral distractors) reflects the cost to distractor processing.
Perceptual load was found to significantly reduce distractor
response-competition effects [9,14], even when the distrac-
tor was presented at fixation [15] as well as negative priming
effects (measured for distractors that appear as the target on a
subsequent trial, e.g. [16]). Perceptual load was also found to
significantly reduce effects of irrelevant attentional capture:
the slowing of target RTs in the presence (versus absence) of
salient but entirely irrelevant distractors [17]). We note that
other types of task load that are not perceptual but instead
load top-down processes of cognitive control (e.g. working
memory) that are required for activemaintenance of the proces-
sing priorities in the task can lead to the opposite effect,
increasing distractor interference rather than reducing it
(owing to reduced control over the task priorities). This contrast
clarifies the specificity of the effects on distractor processing to
perceptual load per se (see [10,11,18] for review of other types
of task load).
These effects establish the critical role for perceptual load in
determining the efficiency of task performance in the face of
distractions. However, they cannot lead to direct conclusions
about the effects of perceptual load on conscious perception.
The elimination of distractor effects on RT by higher loads
might be attributable to reduced distractor intrusions into con-
scious perception, as the theory predicts, but RT effects are also
open to alternative accounts that postulate no role for percep-
tual load in conscious perception. For example, it is known
that priming can result from unconscious processing of the dis-
tractors [19] raising the possibility that both the distractor
interference effects in low load and their reduction under
high load may reflect various degrees of unconscious proces-
sing. Note that while response competition and negative
priming can be explained in this way, this interpretation fits
less well with the demonstrations of reduced attentionalcapture by entirely irrelevant distractors (e.g. cartoon charac-
ters, such as Superman) under higher load. As the cartoons
are not associated with task responses, their interference with
the task RT cannot be attributed to unconscious priming of
any of the letter responses in the search task. The effects of irre-
levant capture were also recently found to correlate with
conscious reports of mind-wandering [20] in further support
of the interpretation that the capture effects reflect intrusions
into perceptual awareness, which, by extension, is subjected
to modulation by perceptual load (see also Forster & Lavie’s
[21] demonstration of the modulation of mind-wandering by
perceptual load).
Yet another alternative account of the effects of perceptual
load on distractor interference suggests that distractors might
always enter awareness, regardless of the level of perceptual
load. On this account, the reduced distractor interference
effects under higher load might reflect their de-prioritization
when the task becomes more difficult (although see Lavie &
de Fockert’s [22], demonstration that increased task difficulty
with only minimal increase in perceptual load does not lead
to reduced distractor interference effects). Thus, the effects of
perceptual loadon theRTmeasures ofdistractor processing can
be attributed to processes that are either earlier (e.g. uncon-
scious priming) or later (e.g. de-prioritization of response)
than awareness.3. Perceptual load and neural processing related
to awareness
Increased perceptual load is associated with a larger signal in
fronto-parietal regions [23–27]. This may reflect a more
effective application of the top-down bias in conditions of
high load. Importantly, load theory also leads to clear and
strong predictions about sensory brain responses to stimuli.
Task-irrelevant stimuli should elicit a brain response, even
with a top-down bias to ignore them, in tasks involving low
(b)
1.6°
6.2°
1.2°
12.4°
stimulus (0.1 s)
delay period (3 s)
memory probe (3 s)
time
black
white
red
green
blue
yellow
fixation (1 s)(a)
1 10
p = 0.02
100
50
60
70
80
90
100
log contrast (%)
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 (%
) low load
high load
Figure 2. Perceptual load and the CRF. (a) Example of high-load displays.
(b) Psychometric functions for low- (black curve) and high- (grey curve) percep-
tual load. The estimated contrast threshold parameter for each psychometric
function is also shown in dashed vertical lines (contrast threshold yielding
half-maximum performance). Each data point represents the mean across
participants. Error bars are +1 s.e.m.
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nificantly reduce the brain response to task-irrelevant stimuli.
Numerous neuroimaging studies provided support for these
predictions, showing that the level of perceptual load in the
task determines the neural response evoked by a wide range
of task-irrelevant stimuli. For instance, sensory signals and
activity in ventral visual cortex in response to task-irrelevant
letters and images of places and objects can be reduced when
subjects are engaged in a high perceptual load task [28–31].
Moreover, visual cortex responses evoked by visually salient
stimuli (e.g. flickering checkerboards, moving dot displays)
are also modulated by the level of perceptual load in a task
[32–34]. These modulations can even be found as early as pri-
mary visual cortex (V1) and the lateral geniculate nucleus
[35,36]. Furthermore, effects of perceptual load were found
on temporally early signals [37] and within the first 100 ms of
processing [38]. In fact, this last result was obtained with
the C1 ERP component which is thought to reflect the initial
afference to V1 [37,38], suggesting that perceptual load is influ-
encing the excitability of V1 such that unattended information
is being modulated on first arriving in V1.
Clearly then, distractor processing throughout the visual
stream depends on the level of perceptual load. For most the-
ories of awareness, such variation in neural processing is a
prerequisite for variation in awareness [39–41]; awareness is cor-
relatedwith the extent towhich the stimulus activates both early
sensory and category-selective areas of visual cortex [42–49].
However, without direct assessment of their effects on
awareness reports, the load modulations of neural responses
to distractors described above remain suggestive with respect
to the role of perceptual load in awareness. So far, only one
of the load neuroimaging studies has included a measure of
awareness. Rees et al. [32] accompanied their fMRI experiment
with a measure of the subjective reports of motion after-effects
and found that higher perceptual load not only modulated
motion-related activity in V5, but also led to reduced subjective
duration of the reported motion after-effect. Evidence that
directly ties the effects of perceptual load on the level of
visual cortical signal to subjective awareness reports comes
from a more recent TMS study. Muggleton et al. [50] measured
the intensity of magnetic stimulation over area V5 that was
required to elicit the subjective percept of a flash of light
(in other words the phosphene threshold), while subjects
performed a letter search task under different levels of percep-
tual load (similar to the search task shown figure 1b). High
perceptual load in the search task resulted in increased phos-
phene threshold and this was true even when participants
made the phosphene report first, before the search response,
thus ruling out alternative accounts in terms of a greater like-
lihood of a memory decay under higher load. In addition,
these effects were only found within a time period related to
the perceptual processing in the task, thus suggesting the
effects were not due to general effects of task difficulty, for
example, leading to a more conservative response criterion in
the high load. Moreover, the effects of perceptual load on the
motion after-effect have been recently replicated in a study
that used the criterion-free nulling technique to assess the per-
ception of the motion after-effect [51]. Although the results of
these studies are encouraging for our claim that perceptual
load is an important determinant of the relationship between
attention and awareness, they are confined to the case of
visual motion. Some of the other imaging findings described
earlier may not necessarily implicate a change in awareness.For example, the demonstrations ofmodulations of V1 response
to irrelevant checkerboards under load may be taken on some
accounts [39] to reflect variations of unconscious processing,
althoughnote that demonstrations of the critical role of feedback
loops between V1 and extrastriate visual areas for perceptual
awareness [52] can also explain how these early modulations
by load may be tied to changes in conscious perception. The
studies reviewed in §4 directly address the effects of perceptual
load on subjective awareness reports for a great variety of
stimuli and awareness measures.4. Perceptual load and direct measures of
subjective awareness
Direct measures of subjective awareness have been used
in a range of paradigms: inattentional blindness, change
blindness, attentional blink and signal detection. Perceptual
load was found to modulate awareness reports in all these
paradigms as we review next.
(a) Load-induced inattentional blindness
Cartwright-Finch & Lavie [13] set out to test directly the effects
of perceptual load on subjective awareness reports within the
inattentional blindness paradigm [53]. They manipulated
perceptual load in a cross task (figure 1a) or search task
(figure 1b) and found substantial effects of perceptual load
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estingly, the baseline level of awareness in conditions of low
load varied between experiments but the robust modulation
by perceptual load remained of similar magnitude.
More recently, a similar result was found for dynamic
inattentional blindness displays in which participants tracked
moving letters [54]. When the motion-tracking load was
higher (letters moving at higher speeds) fewer participants
(32% as opposed to 71%) detected an unexpected cross that
moved straight across the screen.
Although these findings are a step in the right direction of
determining whether perceptual load determines awareness,
the retrospective measure of awareness with a surprise ques-
tion about an unexpected stimulus, raises the possibility that
failures to report the presence of the stimulus may reflect, at
least in part, rapid forgetting (i.e. ‘inattentional amnesia’;
[55]) of a weakly encoded unexpected stimulus. Another
possibility is that the inattentional blindness findings reflect
a change in the response criterion, such that people may be
more reluctant to admit noticing an unexpected stimulus
for which there is only a weak trace in conditions of high per-
ceptual load.
Macdonald & Lavie [56] therefore devised a visual search
plus detection task in which detection is assessed for an
expected stimulus (a meaningless squiggle, appearing in the
periphery), thus avoiding the delay involved in processing
a surprise question. Moreover, in some experiments, partici-
pants made their detection response before the search task
response, eliminating the concern about rapid forgetting or
poorer encoding into memory during the longer response
times found under high load. It also rules out the possibility
of de-prioritization of the detection response under high load
(cf. the alternative accounts in terms of changes in response
selection discussed for the measures of distractor effects
on RT in §2). This design also afforded a signal detection
analysis so that the effects of perceptual load on percep-
tual sensitivity per se could be assessed independently from
any potential effects on the response criterion. The results
clearly demonstrated a ‘load-induced blindness’ phenomenon:
despite anticipating and actively attempting to detect the per-
ipheral event, participants had lower perceptual sensitivity
(d’) to the peripheral events when the load of the concurrent
task was high than when it was low. Carmel et al. [57] exten-
ded these findings to show that high perceptual load in
visual search reduces sensitivity for the elementary process
of detection of a light flicker, presented at fixation.
The findings generalized to amanipulation that changes the
processing requirements from feature detection (low load) to
discrimination between conjunctions of features (high load)
for the very same rapid stream of visual stimuli presented at
fixation. Detection sensitivity for a peripheral ‘squiggle’ stimu-
lus was reduced under the high-load condition. Moreover,
these effects extended also up to 750 ms following the primary
RSVP task stimuli, ruling out the possibility that the reduction
was owing purely to sensory competition between the two
displays [58]. Importantly, in all these studies, perceptual load
effects on detection sensitivity were not accompanied by a
change in the response criterion, thus supporting the load
theory hypothesis that sensory perceptual processing is
reduced in conditions of higher load.
In further support of this conclusion are the findings
that the disappearance of a target owing to an artificial
scotoma (i.e. the process of filling in with a dynamic noisebackground) is less likely and takes longer in conditions of
high versus low perceptual load [59].
Note that the various forms of load-induced blindness
were found regardless of whether the stimulus for which
awareness was measured was irrelevant and unexpected [13]
or was defined as task-relevant and the participants wilfully
attempted to detect it [56,57,59].The effects of perceptual
load thus are independent of task-relevance, intention
(whether to detect or to ignore), or expectancy. Indeed studies
that directly compared relevant and irrelevant distractors of
different levels of expectancy [17] report equal modulations
by load for both.
(b) Perceptual load effects on the ‘attentional blink’
Perceptual load has also been shown to increase themagnitude
of failures of awareness owing to a form of a psychological
refractory period termed the attentional blink (AB): the
reduced rates of awareness for the second of two targets pre-
sented within half a second in a rapid visual stream. Higher
perceptual load in the processing of the first target (e.g. requir-
ing discrimination as opposed to detection in low load or
discrimination in the presence of incongruent flanking items
versus congruent ones in lower load) leads to a greater rate
of AB [60–63]. Moreover, higher perceptual load is thought
to cause AB at an earlier perceptual locus compared with the
AB in conditions of lowperceptual load. For example, although
both high and low load targets produced an AB, only higher
load eliminated the N400 signature of semantic processing of
the second target [61]. Thus, while the locus of the AB effect
on awareness is typically thought to be post-perceptual, attrib-
uted, for example, to interference with encoding into working
memory [64] or with entering into the fronto-parietal ‘global
work space’ network [65], higher perceptual load can lead to
an earlier locus ofAB. These results are consistentwith our sug-
gestion that perceptual load effects on inattentional blindness
are due to reduced detection sensitivity, and extend the effects
of perceptual load to later perceptual processes of sematic
identification within a rapid serial stream.
(c) Perceptual load and awareness of natural scenes
and objects of socio-biological significance
Some studies have reported that the gist of a natural scene
(e.g. beach versus mountain) appears immune to inatten-
tional blindness [53] and that detection of the presence of
an animal in a scene did not suffer from a dual-task cost
even under conditions that were shown to impair detection
of letters [66]. This type of findings led some researchers to
claim that awareness does not require attention (see [67] for
discussion). How do we reconcile this with the load theory
claim that all perceptual processing is subject to capacity
limits and thus depend on selective attention? Furthermore,
how can the meaning or gist reach awareness if inattention
under high perceptual load reduces early visual processing
related to detection sensitivity for elementary visual proper-
ties [56], which is presumably necessary for detection of the
scene meaning? This apparent conflict can be explained by
suggesting that both the gist of a natural scene and objects
of high socio-biological significance (e.g. faces) are inherently
primed and so require a lower activity threshold to be per-
ceived. Feedback loops between inferior temporal cortex
and earlier regions can sensitize the early regions (e.g. striate
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allowing them to reach awareness under conditions of reduced
availability of attention that typically would preclude awareness
for other objects.
However, if all perceptual processing is subjected to
capacity limits, as load theory proposes, including stimuli
of socio-biological significance, then processing of even
these stimuli should be impacted by sufficiently high load.
In other words, if high perceptual load reduces both the
signal in one area and weakens the strength of vertical con-
nections that mediate feedback loops between areas, then
awareness for primed stimuli would also be reduced when
the load is high enough. Indirect support for this suggestion
comes from the findings that awareness of natural scenes
does depend on attention in tasks that appear to involve a
higher level of perceptual load (e.g. higher set sizes or more
rapid presentation rate compared with the earlier studies;
see [68,69]). More direct support for this claim comes from
a recent study [70] that varied the level of perceptual load
in a motion-tracking task and found substantial reduction
in the perception of the natural scene background in con-
ditions of higher perceptual load (involving higher speed
compared with the low-load conditions).2
Our account helps also to reconcile the findings that
change blindness (the failure to detect a change between
two images across some form of visual disruption (e.g. a
screen flicker or ‘mud splashes’ [71]) is often found for nat-
ural scenes as well as for human faces [46,72]. The visual
disruption obscures the luminance transient that would nor-
mally call attention to the change. Moreover, in the ‘mud
splashes’ paradigm the disruptions in the form of additional
transients, do not overlap with the location of the change.
This is suggestive of a role for attention in this phenomenon,
(with the disruptions serving to draw attention away from
the changes), but it does not speak to the role of perceptual
load. However, the natural scenes used in most change blind-
ness experiments are typically rich in detail and so appear
to involve a high level of perceptual load. More direct sup-
port for the role of perceptual load was found in studies
that showed that a higher display set size leads to greater
rates of change blindness [73,74]; however, as these studies
varied the set size of the stimuli that are the candidates for
change their effects might be attributed to increased decision
uncertainty in the higher set sizes rather than any change in
perceptual awareness. More direct support for the role of per-
ceptual load in awareness or blindness for change comes
from a study that assessed change detection for images of
faces or places that flanked a letter search display (see [75] for
a preliminary report). Perceptual load was varied in the letter
search task in a similar manner to that depicted in figure 1b.
On change trials, one of the face or place images changed to
another image from the same category. The pair of successive
displays cycled twice (a ‘two-shot’ instead of ‘one-shot’ para-
digm) in order to avoid floor level performance. As predicted,
greater rates of change blindness occurred during high per-
ceptual load. Note that because perceptual load was varied
for a separate letter task, these effects can be more clearly
attributed to limited-capacity attention allocation, rather than
to increased clutter which may cause low-level visual interfer-
ence (e.g. lateral masking) or increased decision uncertainty
(with greater number of stimuli that could potentially change)
in the high-load condition.5. Perceptual load and the contrast
response function
The fact that phenomena of subjective blindness under high
perceptual load are also associated with neural modulations
of primary visual cortex raises the interesting possibility that
perceptual load effects might be akin to turning down the
contrast of a stimulus. This, then, would be a fundamental
limit on awareness; perceptual loadmay turndown the contrast
of an unattended stimulus rendering it less visible. If this were
the case, then it could explain the various phenomena of
load-induced blindness described above. To investigate this
possibility, we examined the effects of perceptual load on the
contrast response function (CRF). By plotting the psychometric
function relating stimulus contrast to discrimination sensitivity
under different levels of load, we can establish how percep-
tual load might affect visual processing of stimulus contrast.
The hypothesis that perceptual load might reduce visual
cortex response to contrast would predict a rightward shift in
the CRF, so that in conditions of higher perceptual load the
stimulus requires a higher level of contrast to be detected com-
pared with conditions of low perceptual load: an effect of
reduced contrast gain. Alternatively, the effects of percep-
tual load might be independent of those of stimulus contrast,
in which case high perceptual load might only reduce the
level of response gain at each level of contrast (resulting in
a lower asymptote and shallower slope of the CRF but no
rightward shift).
Previous studies of the effects of attention on the CRF have
typically assessed the effects of spatial cuing [76,77] but have
not varied perceptual load.Of greater relevance to our question
are two studies that compared the CRF in single- versus dual-
task conditions, which required the participants to perform the
contrast detection task concurrently with another task: either
an additional oddball detection task [78] or an RSVP task
[79]. While they both showed a reduced response gain in the
dual (versus single) task conditions only, Huang & Dobkins
[79] also found reduced contrast gain in the dual-task con-
ditions. Although differences in the contrast ranges used in
the studies may contribute to the difference in results, the
arguably more demanding RSVP task used by Huang &
Dobkins [79] raises the possibility that high perceptual load
would reduce contrast gain. In both of these studies, however,
the dual- but not single-task conditions confounded attention
with a delay in the response to the contrast task (in order to
first accommodate the central task response). Thus, the effects
of dual (versus single) task on the CRF may be owing, in part,
to the rapid forgetting and deprioritization of the CRF task, in
addition to or instead of an effect of perceptual load. Therefore,
to assess the effects of perceptual load on the CRFwithout con-
founding the effects of deprioritization or rapid forgetting we
designed a novel perceptual load task in which participants
performed an orientation-discrimination task (for Gabor
patches of differing contrasts) while encoding into short-term
memory either just the colour feature of a single square (low
load) or the conjunction of colour and location for a set of six
squares (high load, see figure 2a). In this way, the task
remained a dual task under both of the load conditions, and
perceptual load was varied at the time that the peripheral
Gabor patch was presented; however, the participants
responded immediately to the orientation task, whereas the
effectiveness of the perceptual load manipulation was
rstb.royalsociet
7
 on July 14, 2014rstb.royalsocietypublishing.orgDownloaded from measured upon the appearance of amemory probe following a
delay. Note that as the primary task required continuousmain-
tenance of the memory set throughout the whole trial period,
subjects could not just serially perform first the encoding
task, then the CRF task. Instead, they clearly had to share atten-
tion between the two tasks. ypublishing.org
Phil.Tra(a) Method
(i) Participants
FourteenUniversityCollegeLondonstudents (aged20–35years)
were paid for their participation.3 All participants had normal
or corrected-to-normal vision and no colour blindness.ns.R.Soc.B
369:20130205(ii) Stimuli and procedure
Figure 2a depicts the stimuli and procedure for this experiment.
Trials startedwith a 1 s presentation of a fixation cross followed
bya 100 mspresentation of a stimulus display,which contained
a set of one (low load) or six (high load) coloured squares
(0.388  0.388) randomly placed on a 3  3 grid (1.388  1.388)
centred at fixation. Each square was of a different colour,
chosen randomly from black (less than 0.01 cd m22), blue
(x ¼ 0.15, y ¼ 0.07; 29.05 cd m22), cyan (x ¼ 0.20, y ¼ 0.27;
69 cd m22), green (x ¼ 0.27, y ¼ 0.59; 65.84 cd m22), magenta
(x ¼ 0.28, y ¼ 0.14; 48.20 cd m22), pink (x ¼ 0.32, y ¼ 0.30;
69.14 cd m22), red (x ¼ 0.62, y¼ 0.33; 39.56 cd m22), white
(77 cd m22) and yellow (x ¼ 0.40, y ¼ 0.49; 73.61 cd m22).
The stimulus display also contained a tilted Gabor in the
periphery for the orientation-discrimination task. The Gabor
patch (sinusoidal grating of 3 cpd enveloped in a Gaussian
window, tilted left or right) was presented with equal likeli-
hood within a left or right columnar bar (vertical length:
12.48; horizontal eccentricity from midline: 6.28) with the
exact location within the columnar bar randomly assigned.
The tilt angle of the Gabor patch was individually assessed
for each participant with a staircase procedure prior to the
main experiment using an accelerated stochastic approxi-
mation method obtaining target-contrast estimates that
resulted in approximately 75% accuracy rate [81]. In order
to capture the full psychometric function, the method of con-
stant stimuli was used; the Gabor contrast was randomly
chosen in each trial from a set of eight contrasts (0.1, 7.3,
14.4, 21.6, 35.9, 43.1, 66.5 and 90%) with an equal number
of contrasts across all trials.
Following the stimulus display, participants were given
up to 2.5 s to respond with their left hand as to whether the
Gabor was tilted clockwise (index finger) or counter-clock-
wise (middle finger), followed by a 500 msec blank screen.
Next, a memory probe appeared for up to 3 s (or until
response) comprising one coloured square either in the
same location as the single item from the memory set (low
load) or in any of the memory set locations (high load). Par-
ticipants indicated with a right-hand response whether the
colour of the memory probe matched that of the memory
set item that appeared at the same location as the memory
probe (index finger indicated ‘same’, middle finger indicated
‘different’, each condition ‘equally likely’). Following an
incorrect memory response, ‘WRONG memory response’
appeared above fixation. Responses to the two tasks were
not speeded. Participants completed six 64-trial runs (follow-
ing one practice run), resulting in a total of 384 trials (192
trials per load condition). The perceptual load conditionwas blocked in eight-trial blocks (counterbalanced in an
ABBABAAB fashion) within each run.(b) Results and discussion
Accuracy rates in the visual short-term memory task
decreased significantly from the low- (M ¼ 95%, s.d. ¼ 3%)
to the high- (M ¼ 64%, s.d. ¼ 4%) load condition, t13 ¼
29.65, p, 0.001, d ¼ 1.91, indicating that the high-load con-
dition was more difficult. Moreover, a two-way ANOVA on
visual short-term memory accuracy rates as a function of
load (low, high) and orientation-discrimination accuracy
(correct, incorrect) showedno effect of orientation-discrimination
accuracy nor an interaction (F, 1 for both), thus confirming
that subjects prioritized the visual short-term memory encoding
over the orientation-discrimination as instructed.
To assess whether the effects of perceptual load on visual
detection are consistent with contrast gain or response gain,
the data from each participant were fitted to the Weibull
contrast response model. c(x; a, b, g, l) ¼ g þ (1 – g – l)
F(x; a, b), where x is the stimulus contrast, a, b, g, l are
the fitted model parameters which determine the shape
of the psychometric function, and F is the Weibull
function: F(x; a, b) ¼ 1 – exp(–(x/a)b), with x[ (21,þ1),
a[ (21, þ1), b[ (21, þ1). The contrast threshold (a,
alpha), the slope (b, beta) and the asymptote (l, lambda)
of the CRF were left to vary freely and estimated separ-
ately for the low- and high-load conditions. Gamma (g)
represented the chance level and was set at 0.50.
Fits were performed using maximum-likelihood estimation.
Goodness-of-fit was assessed with deviance scores, which were
calculated as the log-likelihood ratio between a fully saturated
model and the data model. This analysis confirmed good fits
in all participants, as indicated by cumulative probability
estimates of the obtained deviance scores (all p-values, 0.05).
Figure 2b shows the group-average psychometric functions
and their Weibull fits for the low- and high-load conditions.
A comparison of the estimated individual contrast thresholds
(a) between low and high load confirmed a significant increase
in the contrast threshold from the low- (M ¼ 18%, s.d.¼ 8%) to
high-load condition (M ¼ 27%, s.d. ¼ 13%), t13 ¼ 2.64, p ¼
0.023, d ¼ 0.79 (figure 2b). Importantly, the same analysis did
not reveal any significant differences on the estimated asymp-
totes (low load, M ¼ 80%, s.d. ¼ 7%; high load, M ¼ 79%,
s.d. ¼ 9%, t13 ¼ 0.20, p ¼ 0.85, d ¼ 0.07) or the slope (low
load, Mdn¼ 4.21, s.d. ¼ 42.54; high load, Mdn ¼ 4.413,
s.d. ¼ 46.08), t13 ¼ 20.27, p ¼ 0.79, d ¼ 0.08; of4 the psycho-
metric function between the two conditions.
These results demonstrate that high perceptual load shifts
the CRF to the right without affecting the slope and the asymp-
tote of the psychometric function. This finding is consistent
with the predictions of the contrast gain model and indicates
that perceptual load interacts interchangeably with contrast.
Note that as in many of the previous load studies reviewed
above, our manipulation of load in a colour- and location-
based task did not change the feature relevance of the CRF
task (which concerned contrast and orientation). This suggests
that our effects cannot be accounted for in terms of reduced fea-
ture-based attention (which should only lead to an effect on
response gain, see [78]), but instead are caused by the increased
demand on perceptual capacity in the high-load conditions.
Our findings that perceptual load can reduce the contrast
gain, an effect equivalent to a reduction in the effective
rstb.
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neural sensitivity to contrast, in conditions of high load.royalsocietypublishing.org
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369:201302056. Perceptual load and unconscious processing
It is useful at this point to make a clear distinction between
the possibility that attention serves as a gateway specifically
for awareness (as defined in §1a as a phenomenological per-
ceptual experience that is accessible to conscious report) and
the possibility that attention is the gateway to all sensory pro-
cessing of stimuli from its very early stages, including those
that are unconscious.
Although all the studies reviewed so far show that high
perceptual load reduces the level of perceptual awareness,
and as such are open to both interpretations, in load theory
the effects of perceptual load should not be confined to
awareness. The competition for limited-capacity perceptual
and neural representation resources should not be restricted
to just conscious representations.
To address directly the effects of perceptual load on
unconscious processing, Bahrami et al. [82] manipulated
perceptual load in an RSVP task presented at fixation and
measured V1 responses to stimuli that were rendered effec-
tively invisible with the continuous flash suppression (CFS)
method [83]. Despite the fact that the stimuli remained invis-
ible under both load conditions, V1 responses to these
invisible gratings were significantly reduced with higher per-
ceptual load in the task. Bahrami et al. [84] have also
demonstrated that high perceptual load reduces orientation
adaptation for orientation stimuli that were again suppressed
from conscious awareness with the CFS method.
Previous attempts to investigate whether unconscious
processing of orientation depends on attention lead to discre-
pant results; for example, a manipulation of spatial attention
was found to either reduce [85] or have no effect on [86]
orientation adaptation for stimuli rendered unconscious
during adaption. These inconsistencies underscore the impor-
tance of considering perceptual load in assessing the effects
of attention. The earlier studies simply asked participants
either to attend to or away from the unseen adaptor. Percep-
tual load theory predicts that such requests will not be
sufficient to modulate processing of the unseen stimulus.
Instead, effects of attention on unseen (or seen) ignored
stimuli will only be observed when resources are sufficiently
engaged by another task or stimulus and thus unavaila-
ble to the stimulus in question. By varying the perceptual
load of a task, Bahrami et al. [82,84] showed clear effects of
attention on unconscious processing. Indeed, Bahrami et al.
[84] used the same CFS method as Kanai et al. [86] to render
the orientation stimuli invisible during adaptation; thus
the contrasting findings can be safely attributed to the mani-
pulation of perceptual load rather than other factors, for
example, the effectiveness of the method used for suppression
from consciousness.
These findings challenge some proposals that equate
attention with awareness [87,88] as well as those suggesting
that attention acts as the gateway to awareness (e.g. [89]) or
can only act on conscious representations to allow them to
be reported [90]. They clarify that perceptual processing
has limited capacity, even at early levels of representations
that remain unconscious, and emphasize the importance ofconsidering perceptual load throughout the perceptual
processing stream from unconscious to conscious levels.
7. Summary and conclusion
Load theory resolved the enduring debate between early and
late selection views as to whether attention excludes irrele-
vant information before or after perceptual awareness.
Instead of attention having a fixed locus, the theory argues
that awareness depends on the availability of limited-
capacity attention. High perceptual load exhausts capacity,
whereas low perceptual load leaves ‘spare’ capacity, resulting
in full perceptual awareness of both relevant and irrelevant
information. Thus, although the allocation of limited-capacity
attention is a necessary condition for awareness, attention
and perceptual awareness are selective only in conditions of
high perceptual load. The evidence we discuss includes the
effects of load on the level of distractor intrusions, neuro-
imaging reports showing extensive modulations of the neural
response to ignored stimuli throughout visual cortex (includ-
ing primary cortex, subcortical pathways, early response
components, such as C1 and responses to stimuli that remain
unconscious) as well as behavioural reports of ‘load-induced
blindness’. These behavioural reports were found in various
tasks measuring awareness, and a measure of the effects of
load on the CRF suggests that perceptual load effects can be
equivalent to a reduction in the effective contrast of a stimulus.
Thus, the effects of load-induced blindness could be explained
in terms of reduced neural sensitivity to contrast, which appear
analogous to load dimming the light. The results converged
across the different paradigms, some of which used a single
task and assessed the effects of load on irrelevant processing
(as was the case for the distractor and imaging paradigms, as
well as the traditional inattentional blindness tasks), while
others (e.g. those using direct measures of awareness reports)
used a dual-task design and assessed the effects of load on
task-relevant processing. Thus, the effects of perceptual
load on information processing apply across the board and
the convergence across very different paradigms rules out
any alternative accounts in terms of task-specific factors.
Overall, perceptual load has been shown to influence the
degree of processing related to perceptual awareness across
multiple stages of the visual system, from the very early sensory
processing stages (including those remaining unconscious) to
those that have a profound effect on visual awareness.Endnotes
1At this point, it is perhaps important to clarify that load theory does
not suggest a serial two-stage model whereby attentional allocation
to the relevant information happens first followed by a spillover of
remaining capacity (cf. [12]). Instead, the same outcome can be
achieved with a simultaneous parallel processing model in which a
limited capacity is allocated in parallel to all stimuli with their
priority reflected in different processing weights.
2Note that fine-grained variations in load are necessary to investigate
an interesting prediction of our claim: some levels of load would be
sufficient to exhaust capacity for the non-primed objects, whereas
only higher levels of load would be sufficient to exhaust capacity
for the primed objects. This should be an interesting future research
avenue.
3Data available from the Dryad digital repository: http://doi.org/10.
5061/dryad.h8t06 [80].
4Medians of the individual mean slopes are reported owing to one
outlier subject with an outlier slope value that would have skewed
the overall mean.
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